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Abstract
This paper develops a dynamic monopolistic competition model with het-
erogenous ﬁrms to analyze the eﬀects of uncertainty on international trade. We
characterize a stationary equilibrium, with N symmetric countries, where ﬁrms’
productivities evolve stochastically over time. Our model retains the main re-
sults of previous recent papers like Melitz (2003) and Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and
Kortum (2003) and provides additional new predictions. Reentry export costs
generate hysteresis in export participation creating a band of inaction within the
stationary distribution of ﬁrms’ productivities. The decision to export becomes
history-dependent and new entrants and incumbent ﬁrms might sustain tempo-
rary negative proﬁts before becoming proﬁtable. Most importantly, the model
is very amenable to estimation and simulation, therefore representing a useful
tool for analyzing the eﬀects of trade policies. Several moments, like average age,
size and productivity of diﬀerent categories of ﬁrms (exporters, entrants, exiters,
incumbents), the hazard rate of exiting or of becoming an exporter as a function
of age and others have closed-form solutions that are crucial for matching static
and dynamic features of the data.
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Recent empirical studies, like Bernard and Jensen (1995), Clerides et al. (1998) and
Anderson (2005) suggest that successful theoretical frameworks for studying ﬁrms and
the decision to export should incorporate intraindustry heterogeneity in size and pro-
ductivity and take into account international trade costs. Firms are heterogeneous
in many respects: ﬁrms’ productivities diﬀer widely even within narrowly deﬁned
industries; exporting ﬁrms are, on average, more productive and bigger than nonex-
porting counterparts. International trade costs are large, even between apparently
highly integrated economies. Some costs are increasing in the amount shipped while
other costs are ﬁxed and occur every time the ﬁrm tries to enter in a foreign market.
In the past couple of years, the literature on international trade has successfully
addressed some of these issues: Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003)1 develop a
Ricardian model of plant-level export behavior while Melitz (2003) provides a model
based on monopolistic competition. These models represent an important step in
reconciling macro- and micro-level trade data but they are mainly static in nature.
Therefore, they don’t address dynamic features of the data like the fact that ﬁrm
productivity, size and exporting status change over time; ﬁrms’ decisions to export do
not depend only on current productivity; exporting ﬁrms coexist with nonexporting
ﬁrms even if they are observationally equivalent in terms of productivity, size or
other characteristics. Moreover, they do not explain other facts like the existence
of a measure of exporters that are less productive than nonexporters or the fact
that entrants or even incumbents might sustain temporary negative proﬁts before
becoming proﬁtable.
On the other side, the literature on ﬁrm dynamics has developed models which
allow for heterogeneity in the characteristics of ﬁrms. A recent contribution in this
respect is the work by Luttmer (2004) who proposes, in a closed economy context, an
analytically tractable model of balanced growth that allows for extensive heterogeneity
in the technologies used by ﬁrms.
1BEJK from here on.
2In this paper, we propose a new model of international trade that, reconciling
the approaches from these two strands of literature, represents a natural evolution of
the ﬁrst wave of new trade models and is consistent with more features of the data.
Building upon Melitz (2003) and Luttmer (2004), we construct a dynamic general
equilibrium model of trade among multiple countries that combines the following
four key ingredients: 1) ﬁrms compete globally to sell their diﬀerentiated product;
2) ﬁrms have heterogeneous productivity; 3) for each ﬁrm, productivity evolves over
time stochastically; 4) entry (or reentry) into the export market requires the ﬁrm to
sustain a sunk cost.
In this world, an entrepreneur makes an initial investment to set up a ﬁrm and
draws a productivity level from a common distribution. Production for the domestic
market starts even if (unlike in Melitz (2003)) initial proﬁts are negative (as long
as they are not too negative) and continues until the sum of current proﬁts and the
value of the option to exit are high enough. If ﬁrm productivity exceeds a cutoﬀ level
it becomes proﬁtable to sell the goods on foreign markets. In order to do that, the
ﬁrm must sustain a sunk cost which can be interpreted as the cost of establishing
distribution channels, learning about the foreign markets preferences and standards
and adapting to them, updating old export products. If, later on, productivity falls
under the level at which the ﬁrm started exporting, the entrepreneur prefers to keep
exporting until the value of current exporting proﬁts plus the value of the option to
stop exporting is bigger than the value of the option of reentering the export market.
The equilibrium in an open economy is therefore characterized by the following:
in every country, 1) consumers maximize their intertemporal utility by choosing a
sequence of dynastic consumption of a composite good, made of available domestic
and foreign varieties, subject to the intertemporal budget constraint 2) there is a
closed-form stationary distribution of ﬁrms’ productivities and within it a band of
inaction; 3) while the distribution is stationary, new ﬁrms enter, incumbent ﬁrms
become more or less productive, export or stop exporting, eventually exit; 4) labor
and goods markets clear.
3An important aspect of the model provided in this paper is that it is easily
amenable to estimation and eﬀectively exploits the advantages of panel dataset at
the ﬁrm or plant level. Closed-form solutions allow the derivation of several static
and dynamic moments that are useful for matching the model to the data: average
size, productivity and age of incumbents, entrants, exiters, exporters or nonexporters,
the hazard function for exiting or for becoming an exporter represent some examples.
In this model, like in Melitz (2003) and BEJK (2003), ﬁrms that are more produc-
tive are bigger, both in terms of output and revenue, and are more likely to export.
However, participation into the export market is characterized by hysteresis. Hys-
t e r e s i si sd e ﬁn e da s" ar e t a r d a t i o no ft h ee ﬀect when the forces acting upon a body
are changed (as if from viscosity or internal friction)"2 a n di no u rc o n t e x tm e a n s
that export participation is history-dependent. The presence of hysteresis has been
documented by, among others, Roberts and Tybout (1997) and is important in un-
derstanding why trade policies might have diﬀerent eﬀects in diﬀerent countries or in
the same country at diﬀerent stages of its evolution and why even temporary policies
m i g h th a v ep e r m a n e n te ﬀects. The presence of hysteresis implies also that, as we
observe in the data3, despite being more productive on average, some exporters are
less productive than some nonexporters. Our model departs from Melitz (2003) also
in predicting that new ﬁrms might sustain initial negative proﬁts and, only later on,
become proﬁtable. As observed in the data, the stationary productivity distribution
follows a Pareto density in the upper tail but it’s increasing in the lower tail, implying
that there are fewer small ﬁr m st h a nw o u l db et h ec a s ei fZ i p f ’ sl a ww a ss a t i s ﬁed.4
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we discuss some facts
about ﬁrm productivity, proﬁtability, entry and export participation using Chilean
2Quote from Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary.
3See Irrarazabal and Opromolla (2005) for Chile, BEJK (2003) for the USA.
4In terms of the distribution, this means that the probability that the size (that in our model
is directly connected to productivity) of a ﬁrm is greater than some z




θ,w i t hθ ' 1. See Simon and Bonini (1958), Gabaix (1999) and Axtell (2001) for
discussions of Zipf’s law and its empirical evidence.
4Table 1: Export Status Transition Matrix, Average 1990-96
export in t +1 do not export in t +1 exit in t +1
export in t .84 .12 .04
do not export in t .04 .89 .07
data. In section 3, we describe the building blocks of the economy under autarky.
In section 4, we describe a multi-country trade model under two alternative cost
assumptions. First, we solve for the trade equilibrium assuming that a ﬁrm can
costlessly entry and exit into the export market. Then, we introduce entry (and
reentry) costs and show how hysteresis arises in the context of international trade with
heterogeneous producers. Finally section 5, concludes and proposes some extensions
to the present framework.
2F a c t s
We begin by presenting some empirical evidence to which we are going to refer to while
developing the theoretical model. We use data from the "Encuesta Nacional Industrial
Anual" (ENIA) conducted annually by Instituto Nacional de Estadistica (INE), the
Chilean government statistical oﬃce. ENIA is an unbalanced panel dataset covering
all Chilean manufacturing plants with ten or more workers. The dataset extends from
1979 to 1996, includes information on approximately 11,000 plants altogether, with
about 4,800 plants per year. It contains detailed information on production, value
added, sales, employment and wages (both white-collar and blue-collar), exports,
investment, depreciation, energy consumption, balance sheet information and other
plant characteristics. Data on plant-level exports were only collected after 1990.
We start by looking at persistence in export participation: Table 1 shows the
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Figure 1: Ratio of Plant Labor Productivity to Overall Mean: Exporters vs. Nonex-
porters, 1992
Table 1 suggests the presence of a high degree of persistence in export status. Out
of 100 plants that export in year t,8 4p l a n t sk e e pe x p o r t i n gt h en e x ty e a r ,1 2p l a n t s
stop exporting but keep producing for the domestic market and 4 plants becomes
inactive. If plants were not exporting to start with, 4 plants start exporting in t +1 ,
89 plants keep selling their product on the domestic market only and 7 plants shut
down. We use this matrix to perform a simple test to check if the data are consistent
with ergodicity and ﬁnd that the average ratio between the number of exporters and
the number of nonexporters is about 3.8, it’s declining over time and is quite close to
the ergodic ratio of 2.8.
A recurrent feature of the data is that exporters are on average more productive
than nonexporters. Figure (1), from Irrarazabal and Opromolla (2005), shows the
histogram of productivity by export status. Productivity is measured as value added
per worker and is normalized using the same overall (exporters and nonexporters)
mean productivity. The distribution of exporters productivity is shifted to the right
with respect to the productivity distribution of non-exporting plants. Value added
per worker at the average exporting Chilean plant is 85 percent higher than at the









(Ha: diff =0 )
p-value(1)
(Ha: diff > 0)
1991 8.54 8.39 1.16 .28 .14
1992 8.70 8.61 1.09 .51 .26
1993 8.94 8.64 1.35 .04 .02
1994 8.97 8.71 1.30 .05 .02
1995 9.14 9.00 1.15 .34 .17
1996 9.32 9.23 1.09 .50 .25
Note: (1) Two-sample t test with equal variances; H0 : the diﬀerence between ln(productivity) when start
exporting and ln(productivity) when stop exporting is equal to zero; (2) exp(ln prodstart-ln prodstop);
average plant that does not export.
This result surpasses previous ﬁndings for U.S. and French data: BEJK show that
the productivity advantage of U.S. plants is about 33 percent overall while Eaton et al.
(2004) ﬁnd that the French exporting ﬁrms’ value added per worker is 12.5 percent
higher than nonexporting counterparts. It’s interesting to note that even though
average productivity is higher for exporters there is a consistent measure of exporters
that are less productive than nonexporters.
The third fact that we present is related to entry and exit from the export market.
Tables (2) and (3) compare the average productivity and size of new exporters and
old exporters, that is, of plants that just started exporting and of plants that just
stopped exporting. We ﬁnd some evidence in support of the hypothesis that plants
decision to enter the export market and to exit the export market does not rely on the
same reference productivity level. Average productivity of new exporters is always
higher than average productivity of old exporters, even though the diﬀerence passes
a two-sample t-test only during part of the sample period.
Figure (2) shows the size distribution of plants, measured in terms of employment,
in 1992. The size distribution follows a Power Law with exponent equal to one (Zipf’s’
Law) if the plot of the natural logarithm of the number of plants above some size level
s against the natural logarithm of plants labor force results in a straight line with









(Ha: diff =0 )
p-value(1)
(Ha: diff > 0)
1991 13.90 13.55 1.42 .09 .05
1992 13.77 13.71 1.06 .80 .40
1993 14.00 13.36 1.90 .01 .00
1994 14.06 13.32 2.10 .00 .00
1995 14.28 14.12 1.17 .49 .25
1996 14.23 14.01 1.25 .27 .14
Note: (1) Two-sample t test with equal variances; H0 :t h ed i ﬀerence between ln(sales) when start
exporting and ln(sales) when stop exporting is equal to zero; (2) exp(ln salesstart-ln salesstop);
slope equal to minus one.5 The data follow Zipf’s’ law quite closely for most of the
size range with two exceptions: there are fewer very small and very big ﬁrms than
what would be consistent with Zipf’s law. Keeping in mind these and other features








































Figure 2: Firm Size Distribution, 1992
5The size s of a plant is distributed as a power law with exponent α and minimum size s0 if the
density of s is f(s)=αs
α
0s
−α−1 (si ≥ s0,α>0). Suppose that N is the number of plants. The rank





where the rank is decreasing in the size of the plant.
Taking natural logs leads to lnr(si)=c − αln(si) where c =l nN + αln(s0).
83 Set Up of the Model
3.1 Preferences
Time is continuous. Let Ωh be the set, of measure L,o fi n ﬁnitely-lived consumers alive
at time t. The economy consists of one sector that produces diﬀerentiated products.
Each consumer is endowed with one unit of labor at every point in time that is supplied
inelastically. The wage is normalized to one. Goods are perishable and hence can only
be used for consumption. The representative consumer has preferences over sequences







where ρ is the time-discounting rate.
In the equilibrium to be deﬁned later there will be a measure Ωt of diﬀerentiated








where σ>1 is the elasticity of substitution between any two diﬀerentiated goods.
The representative consumer chooses ct to minimize the cost of acquiring Ct given
a standard present-value budget constraint. Wealth consists of claims to ﬁrms and















There is a continuum of ﬁrms, of measure M, each choosing to produce a distinct
variety of the goods using labor as input.6 At age a,aﬁrm employs la units of labor to
produce ezala units of the goods. For simplicity, we will refer to za as the productivity
of the ﬁrm.
All ﬁrms share the same overhead per period ﬁxed cost fd > 0,c o n s t a n to v e r
time and age. A ﬁrm must exit if this ﬁxed cost is not paid and exit is irreversible.
Productivity evolves, independently across ﬁrms, according to a Brownian motion
with drift α and diﬀusion coeﬃcient ξ,
za =¯ z + αa + ξBa (4)
where {Ba}a≥0 is a Wiener process and ¯ z is the initial productivity of a ﬁrm. The
initial productivity ¯ z is drawn from a time-invariant probability density g(¯ z). After
entry, the trend of log productivity is determined by α.
A monopolistic competitive producer, with productivity za,o ﬀers the product











where R is aggregate expenditure on the composite good. Firm proﬁts are then






σ represents variable proﬁt s .U s i n g( 5 )a n d( 6 )w ec a ns e et h a tp r o ﬁts depend





¯ m−1Peza¢σ−1 − fd (7)
6Since we will consider a stationary equilibrium where all aggregate variables are constant, from
now on we drop the time subscript in order to simplify the notation.
10A more productive ﬁrm charges a lower price (since marginal costs are lower and
the markup is constant), is bigger both in terms of output and revenue (since lower
price means higher demand and demand is elastic), and earns higher proﬁts than a
less productive ﬁrm (since variable proﬁts are a constant fraction of ﬁrm’s revenue).









This cutoﬀ is decreasing in the price level P (since wage and the markup are the same
for every ﬁrm, the price index is really a measure of the degree of competition that
the ﬁrm has to face in order to sell its product) and in the level of expenditure on
diﬀerentiated goods R. It is increasing in the ﬁxed cost fd and in the elasticity of
substitution σ (provided that R>σ f d, when goods become more substitutable, price
deviations from the general price have bigger eﬀects).
Using the price rule (5), the demand equation (2) and the production function we
can ﬁnd the labor demand of a ﬁrm,
la = C(eza)σ−1 ¯ m−σPσ (8)
which turns out to be a fraction 1





3.3 Entry, Exit and the Stationary Distribution
In this section we derive the stationary distribution of ﬁrms’ productivities. We depart
from previous models used in international trade (see Melitz (2003), Chaney (2005),
and Eaton and Kortum (2002)) by using a model of industry equilibrium with dynamic
stochastic productivities similar to the one of Luttmer (2004). Contrary to Melitz
(2003), ﬁrms are subject to both ex-ante and ex-post uncertainty. Entry requires the
entrepreneur to sustain a sunk cost before being able to know the initial productivity
level. If the initial productivity is high enough the ﬁrm starts producing. After that,
productivity evolves over time according to (4) and the ﬁrm remains active until its
11value, given by the solution of an ordinary diﬀerential equation, is positive. A positive
drift coupled with a positive diﬀusion coeﬃcient in (4) makes it worthwhile to keep
producing even if current proﬁts are negative. However, if proﬁts become too negative
or if the ﬁrm receives a bad shock uncorrelated to productivity, exit takes place. We
begin by deriving the value of a ﬁrm as a function of its productivity level and we
then proceed by deriving the ergodic productivity distribution.
3.3.1 Entry and Exit
Incumbent ﬁrms, indexed by i ∈ ΩI, exit the industry when their productivity falls
below some threshold.7 Exit is irreversible. Firms exit because of productivity reasons
or because of bad shocks uncorrelated with productivity: these occur each period
with an exogenous probability δ. This allows the model to capture exit uncorrelated
to productivity and better match the data. A positive δ, in absence of population
growth, also allows for a stationary productivity distribution compatible with either
a positive or a negative drift in the stochastic process for productivity. The present
value of revenues, and therefore of variable proﬁts, is ﬁnite if the combined discount
factor, given by the sum of the interest rate and the exogenous probability of exit δ,
is smaller than the drift of variable proﬁts. The following assumption guarantees that
this is the case (see the Appendix).
Assumption 1: The preferences and productivity parameter satisfy
ρ + δ>α (σ − 1) + ξ2(σ − 1)2/2
The value function of a ﬁrm with productivity z can be expressed as the sum of
operating proﬁts over the interval (t,t+dt) and the continuation value beyond t+dt.
The value for a ﬁrm that discount ﬂows at the interest rate r is
Vd(z)=
n
π(z)dt + e−(r+δ)dtE [V (z + dz|z)]
o
7Recall that ﬁrms must sustain a positive ﬁxed operating cost fd.
12Using Ito’s lemma and equation (7) for ﬁrm’s proﬁts, we obtain an ordinary diﬀerential












Since a ﬁr mh a st op a yap o s i t i v eﬁxed operating cost, it is optimal to shut down
when productivity falls below some threshold zd.T h ev a l u eo faﬁrm must be zero at




These conditions provide a complete characterization of the optimal policy of an active
ﬁrm, the associated value function and the critical value zd.8 With these boundary





β2 − (σ − 1)
∙
e(σ−1)(z−zd) −








for z>z d, where β2 is the negative root of the characteristic polynomial (see the
Appendix). The value of the ﬁrm is increasing in z and can be nicely interpreted
as the sum of two components: the ﬁrst two terms in Vd(z) reﬂect the expected
discounted present value of the proﬁts ﬂow while the third term represents the value
of the option to suspend the operation when the productivity falls below zd (see the
Appendix).



















is less than one when the productivity
drift α is positive (see the Appendix). This implies that zd <z 0,t h a ti s ,i n c u m b e n t s
and new entrants remain active even if proﬁts are currently negative, as long as they
8See Stokey (2005) "Brownian Models in Economics" lectures notes for more details.
13are not too negative. The intuition is that when z ∈ (zd,z 0) the value of the ﬁrm
is still positive because the stochastic process for proﬁts has a positive drift and
because of the option value to exit. By inspecting the above expression we see that
the barrier is inversely related to the aggregate price level. This will result critical
when we open the economy to international trade. A multilateral trade opening will
decrease the aggregate price level, therefore pushing the lower threshold zd up. This
will be interpreted as a selection eﬀect associated with international competition.
Prior to entry ﬁrms are identical. To enter, they must make an initial investment
fe > 0 (measured in units of labor) which is thereafter sunk. Firms then draw their
productivity from a common distribution g(¯ z) with continuous cdf G(¯ z).U p o ne n t r y
a ﬁrm may decide to exit immediately and not produce (and not pay the ﬁxed cost
fd). New ﬁrms will keep trying to enter the industry until the expected value of a ﬁrm




Vd(¯ z)dG(¯ z) (11)
3.3.2 The Stationary Distribution µ(z)
As in Melitz (2003), in order to determine aggregate variables we need an expres-
sion for the equilibrium distribution of productivities. We are going to characterize
a time invariant distribution of productivities with ﬁnite mean. In the stationary
equilibrium there is a measure of ﬁrms deﬁned over the set of possible ages, initial
and current productivities. The density of this measure is Mµ(a,z, ¯ z) where µ(a,z, ¯ z)
is a probability density. The density Mµ(a,z, ¯ z) must satisfy the following version of











− δµ(a,z, ¯ z) (12)
9See Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for a derivation of the Kolmogorov forward equation using a discrete
random walk approximation.
14Potential entrants are sampling the distribution of initial productivity g(¯ z). Suc-
cessful entry attempts are those for which ¯ z>z d. This implies that the ﬁrst boundary







0 z ≤ zd
where Ma is the number of (attempting) entrants. Another condition is given by the
presence of the lower barrier zd:s i n c eﬁrms exit at zd and no new ﬁrm enter with a
productivity level inferior to zd,w eh a v et h a tµ(a,zd, ¯ z)=0for all a>0.F i n a l l y ,t o
ensure that µ is a density distribution we also require µ(a,z, ¯ z) goes to zero for large
values of (a,z, ¯ z). The solution to the above equation is then given by10




























After lengthy derivations (see the Appendix) we ﬁnd that the probability density of
















while the following is the joint productivity and age probability density conditional
on a particular initial productivity level ¯ z
µ(a,z|¯ z)=
"




where θ and θ∗ are the roots, both non-negative, of the characteristic polynomial
deﬁned by (12).
In order to have a stationary distribution with a ﬁnite mean we need to impose
the following assumption
10See Luttmer (2004) and Harrison (1985) for a similar derivation.
15Assumption 2: The productivity parameters satisfy
δ>α+ ξ2/2
















where the right hand-side is greater than e¯ z−zd if α + ξ2/2 > 0. This means that the
average ﬁrm is more productive than new entrants.
Recall that the solution of the stationary problem is for a particular rate of entry.
Therefore we can use (13) and the fact that (15) is a density to ﬁn dt h er a t eo f

















Note that now we can interpret the solution of the Kolmogorov equation under a
diﬀerent light,
















is the marginal probability density for the initial productivity ¯ z in the stationary
equilibrium. As Luttmer (2004) points out, this probability density is diﬀerent from
g(¯ z), the density of initial productivity among potential entrants, because of the
pre- and post-selection process. Pre-selection implies requires ﬁrms to enter into the
market only if their initial productivity is bigger than zd,s ot h a tg(¯ z) is truncated
at zd. Post-selection implies that ﬁrms with initial productivity close to the cutoﬀ zd
16have a higher probability of exiting due to a negative ﬁrm-speciﬁc shock and therefore
they are downweighted in µ(¯ z): the term 1 − e−θ∗(¯ z−zd) is increasing in ¯ z.T h ee ﬀect
of post-selection is stronger when exit uncorrelated to productivity is relatively less
important (lower δ).
Finally, we are ready to determine an expression for the stationary distribution of
productivities. In this ergodic equilibrium the distribution of productivities is deter-
mined by the process of entry, exit, and selection. In particular, selection determines
how the initial distribution from where the potential ﬁrms draw their productivities
generates the stationary distribution of active ﬁrms. In the appendix we show that

























Note that the probability density of productivity is a weighted average of the
conditional probability densities µ(z|¯ z).I f g(.) is a degenerate distribution with all
the mass at some point ¯ z,t h e nµ(z|¯ z) itself is the equilibrium ﬁrm productivity
density. Each µ(z|¯ z) is proportional to e−θz when z>¯ z and therefore behaves, in the
upper tail, as a Power law with exponent θ for ez, our productivity coeﬃcient. When
zd <z<¯ z, the probability density is increasing in z (see Figure (3)).
This is consistent with the productivity distribution that we showed in Section
2. This expression has a structure similar to the distribution shown in Melitz(2003)
in equation (8). In our setting, though, the equilibrium productivity distribution
µ(z) diﬀers from the productivity distribution of potential entrants because of both
pre-selection and post-selection.
17zd  z  z 
Figure 3: Equilibrium Probability Density of Productivity conditional on Initial Pro-
ductivity ¯ z
4 Equilibrium in a Closed Economy






















where (i) each consumer h chooses optimally sequences {Ct}t≥0 of a composite goods
to maximize the intertemporal utility function of equation (1) subject to an intertem-
poral budget constraint; (ii) incumbent ﬁrms choose, at every age a,p r i c ep(za) and
variable labor l(za) in order to maximize proﬁts, given by equation (7), taking the
price index of the economy as given; (iii) incumbent ﬁrms, at every age a, decide if
to keep being active (Da =1 )o rt oe x i t( Da =0 ) knowing that productivity evolves
according to the Brownian motion of equation (4); (iv) ﬁrms enter, if the productivity
draw is bigger than zd, until the free-entry condition (11) is satisﬁed; (v) labor and
goods markets clear.
With an expression for the stationary distribution of productivity, we can proceed
to solve for the stationary equilibrium under the autarky situation. First, notice that
18by the intertemporal problem of the consumer we pin down the interest rate as
r = ρ
Now we can determine the root of the characteristic polynomial β2 and hence the
value function V (z) from equation (9).
We can use the free entry condition (11) and the threshold equation (10) to solve







where we have used the fact that aggregate revenue must be equal to a markup on
payments to production workers.






The aggregated labor required to set up a ﬁrm and to operate (overhead ﬁxed






Recall that the equilibrium entry rate is given by (17). Hence, from the following
labor market clearing condition we can pin down the number of ﬁrms
Lp + Lf + Le = L (19)
Finally, to ﬁnd the number of entrants we use again the rate of entry condition
(17). Notice that an increase in M does not aﬀect the lower barrier, the average level
of productivity (or proﬁtability), and therefore the average proﬁt level and revenue.
195 The Open Economy
Consider the world economy consisting of N countries all with the structure described
in section 3. We are going to analyze a symmetric countries equilibrium. Each
c o u n t r yi sa s s u m e dt ob ee n d o w e dw i t hL units of labor and labor is not mobile
across countries. Therefore, the nominal wage rate is common and we normalize it
to one. Preferences are common to all countries and given by equation (1). In each
country, potential entrants need to pay a ﬁxed entry cost fe to enter the industry.
They draw an initial productivity from an exogenous distribution G(¯ z). Productivity
thereafter evolves according to a Brownian motion with parameters (α,ξ). A ﬁrm
decides to enter when the expected proﬁts are high enough to cover the entry cost.
If the ﬁrms decide to enter it also has to pay a ﬁxed operating cost fd. The ﬁxed
costs fe and fd are incurred for both exporting and non exporting ﬁrms. Given the
structure of the shock and the ﬁxed cost of production, in each country a stationary
ﬁrm size distribution will emerge.
In what follows we analyze two kinds of international equilibrium. In the ﬁrst
case, that we develop as a benchmark, ﬁrms can costlessly enter and exit from the
export market. In the second case, we assume that there is a positive sunk entry
cost fhy that the ﬁrm has to sustain every time the ﬁrm wants to enter the exporting
sector. In both cases, we suppose that a ﬁrm in country i that exports to country j
bears a ﬁxed operating export cost fx per foreign market. Goods that are exported
are then subject, like in Melitz (2003) and BEJK (2003) to a melting transportation
cost τ>1. That is, we assume that country i needs to ship τ units of the goods for
one unit to arrive in country j.
5.1 The Case of No Entry Cost
In this section, we describe the trade equilibrium when there is no entry cost. We
consider the economy in its stationary equilibrium and we drop the index for age and
time. Like in the closed-economy equilibrium, a ﬁrm with productivity z operating
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¯ m−1Pez¢σ−1 − fx (20)
Assume that each ﬁrm can enter and exit from the export sector costlessly. This






¯ m−1Pez¢σ−1 − fx,0
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Since the forcing function is deﬁned diﬀerently when current proﬁts are positive
or negative we need to solve the equation separately for the two cases and then stitch
together the two solutions at the point where proﬁts from exporting are zero,















fx which guarantees that zex >z d.N o t et h a tt h i sa l s oi m p l i e st h a tt h e
least productive exporter is more productive than the most productive nonexporter
(see Figure (4)). This is something that we do not usually observe in the data and
that we will take into account in the cost-of-entry case.
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Figure 4: Firms’ Productivity Distribution, No Cost of Entry in Foreign Markets








































Note that in V>ex(z), the second and fourth terms represents the expected discounted
proﬁt ﬂows from exporting while the remaining two terms represent the value of the
option to stop exporting should productivity fall below zex. In the region (zd,z ex),
V<ex(z) represents instead the value of the option to resume exporting should pro-
ductivity rise above zex.
Having determined the cutoﬀ productivity value for exporting zex,w ec a nn o w
draw on the stationary distribution analysis to derive some expressions for the average





















where µ(a,z|z>z ex) is the probability density over age and productivity conditional
on being an exporter. Moreover, knowledge of the productivity distribution and
relevant cutoﬀ values allows us to derive the probability that plants won’t exit before






P(T(zd) >t |x)=1− Φ
µ














is the probability that the ﬁrm will exit no sooner than t years from now given its
current productivity x. These are the model equivalent of some of the facts that we
showed in Section 2 and can be used to match the model to the data.
Trade Equilibrium
To determine the equilibrium we assume that all ﬁxed costs, the distribution g(¯ z)
and the stationary distribution µ(z) are identical for all countries. Once countries are
allowed to trade, new ﬁrms will keep trying to enter the industry until the expected




[Vd(¯ z)+( N − 1)V<ex(z)]dG(¯ z)+( N − 1)
Z +∞
zex
[V>ex(z) − V<ex(z)]dG(¯ z)
(23)
where the equilibrium condition for the cutoﬀs is given by (10) and (??). Note that
the expected value of a ﬁrm include both the possibility that the ﬁrm will produce
23only for the domestic market and that the ﬁrm will also export to all the other N −1























where (i) each consumer h chooses optimally sequences {Ct}t≥0 of a composite goods
to maximize the intertemporal utility function of equation (1) subject to an intertem-
poral budget constraint; (ii) incumbent ﬁrms choose, at every age a,p r i c ep(za) and
variable labor l(za) in order to maximize domestic proﬁts, given by equation (7), and
eventual exporting proﬁts, given by equation (20), taking the price index of the econ-
omy as given; (iii) incumbent ﬁrms, at every age a, decides if to keep being active
(Da =1 )o rt oe x i t( Da =0 ) and if to export (Ea =1 )o rn o t( Ea =0 ) knowing that
productivity evolves according to the Brownian motion of equation (4); (iv) ﬁrms
enter, if the productivity draw is bigger than zd, until the free-entry condition (23) is
satisﬁed; (v) labor and goods markets clear.


















form a system of three equations in the three unknowns zd, zex and P.
Having solved for the thresholds zd and zex and the price level we can determine
the equilibrium number of ﬁrms. To determine the price index observe that all brands
that are produced in a country, by domestic or by foreign ﬁrms, have a consumer price
1/¯ mez and all imported brands have a consumer price of τ/¯ mez when the exporter


















can be used to determine the number of ﬁrms M.11
11M
∗ represents the number of ﬁrms supplying the market or the number of varieties oﬀered.
24A multilateral trade opening in the model explained above reduces the price level
P and therefore induces an increase in the cutoﬀ productivity level zd.This result
resembles similar outcomes in previous trade models with heterogenous ﬁrms. After
trade opening, ﬁrms who want to export have to pay a ﬁxed cost fx, which self-select
high productivity draw ﬁrms into the export market. Domestic ﬁrms with high enough
productivity to survive pay higher wages. Since the labor is constant, competition in
the local labor market pushes up the real wage and forces low productivity ﬁrms to
leave the industry.
5.2 The Case of Entry Cost: Hysteresis
We know analyze the conditions that determines the equilibrium with reentry costs.
When ﬁrms’ productivities are stochastic the introduction of an entry cost gives rise
to hysteresis. This phenomenon has been studied by Dixit (1989), Baldwin (1989)
and suggested by Clerides et-al (1998) in a context similar to ours. Our framework
diﬀerentiates from previous attempts to model hysteresis in export markets in that
we embed the problem in a general equilibrium framework.
As before we have that ﬁrms need to pay a ﬁxed per-period export cost to sell in
each foreign market. However, now assume that each time a ﬁrm decides to enter or
reenter the export market, it has to pay a sunk cost fhy.T h i sc o s tc a nb ei n t e r p r e t e d
as the cost of establishing distribution channels, learning about the foreign markets
preferences and standards and adapting to them and updating old export products.
The next proposition summarizes the optimal policy of a ﬁrm subject to entry
and reentry costs.
Proposition 1 An optimal strategy is characterized by three thresholds {zd,z low,z hi}
with zd <z low <z hi such that (i) a ﬁrm is active if z>z d, (ii) a nonexporting ﬁrm
will stay as a nonexporter as long as z<z hi, and (iii) an exporting ﬁrm will keep
e x p o r t i n ga sl o n ga sz>z low. Furthermore, there is a band of inaction zlow <z<z hi
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Figure 5: Firms’ Productivity Distribution with Cost of Entry in Foreign Markets
where an exporting plant will keep exporting and a nonexporting plant will decide not
to enter the export sector.
The previous proposition allows us also to state the following implication of the
model which we observe in the data.
Proposition 2 T h e r ei sap o s i t i v em e a s u r eo fn o n e x p o r t i n gﬁrms that are more pro-
ductive than some exporting ﬁrms
These two propositions are graphically illustrated in Figure (5).
To prove the previous propositions we need to show the calculation of the relevant
thresholds. As in the case of no entry-cost we have that the value of a ﬁrm that only
sells in the domestic marker is given by:
Vd(z)=
n
πd(z) 4 t + e−(r+δ)4tE [Vd(z + 4z|z)]
o
On the other hand, if the ﬁrms is also exporting we must adjust our analysis
with respect to the previous case. The value of the ﬁrm is now a function of two
state variables, the productivity level z and a discrete state variable which indicates
26whether the ﬁrm is currently exporting or not. For a non exporting ﬁrm, in the region
(zd,z hi) we have






which has the general solution
Vex,low(z)=a1eβ1z + a2eβ2z
where a1 and a2 are constant to be determined and β1 and β2 are the roots of the
quadratic equation determined earlier.
Since the option to export gets very far out of the money as z becomes lower and
lower, the coeﬃcient a2 corresponding to the negative root β2 should be set to zero.
This leaves,
Vex,low(z)=a1eβ1z
Next let’s consider the value of an exporting ﬁrm in the region (zlow,∞).T h e
ordinary diﬀerential equation is






where πex(z) is given by equation (20).
The general solution to this equation (after setting the coeﬃcient corresponding





















27which after replacing the expressions for Vex,low(.) and Vex,hi(.) give a system of
four equations in the four unknowns zlow, zhi, a1 and b2.T h eﬁrst and third conditions
guarantee continuity in the function expressing the value of the ﬁrm. Note that, unlike
in the previous case without cost of entry, the value of an exporting ﬁrm and the value
of a nonexporting ﬁrm are interlinked and must be determined simultaneously. The
equations forming the system are very nonlinear in the thresholds so that it’s diﬃcult
to get an analytical solution. A numerical solution can obtained but we start here by
illustrating some properties about the thresholds (see the Appendix for derivations).
First, the thresholds satisfy 0 <z low <z hi < ∞ and the coeﬃcients a1 and b2
are positive. Second, suppose that the ﬁr mi sn o ta ne x p o r t e ra n dt h a ti tb e l i e v e s
that z will persist unchanged forever. The ﬁrm will decide to become an exporter
if πex(z) > (r + δ)fhy. This is the exporting cutoﬀ when there is no uncertainty
and z is constant over time. In our case instead, πex(zhi) > (r + δ)fhy > 0 which
means that zhi, the exporting cutoﬀ, is larger than the productivity level at which the
ﬁrm decides to become an exporter when there is no uncertainty and z is constant
over time. This also implies that zhi is bigger than zex, the productivity cutoﬀ for
exporting in the no-entry-cost case. When domestic producers take into account the
uncertainty over future proﬁts, they are more reluctant to become exporters and when
they are already exporters they are more reluctant to abandon. This is consistent with
the diﬀerence between the average productivity for new and old exporters that we
showed in Section2. Third, the width of the band of inaction (zlow,z hi) is an increasing
function of the sunk cost fhy. As the sunk cost fhy increases the lower cutoﬀ, zlow,i s
decreasing while the upper cutoﬀ, zhi, is increasing.
Trade Equilibrium
To determine the equilibrium with the assumption of positive reentry cost we
proceed as in the previous case. However, we need to be careful to account for the
export status within the band of inaction and we need to state the following,
Conjecture There exists a probability density µe(z) with positive support over
(zlow,z hi) a n ds u c ht h a tµe(zlow)=0and µe(zhi)=µ(zhi), representing the distribu-
28tion of exporters over the band of inaction.12
We can therefore determine the equilibrium price index in the economy using the























As before new ﬁrms are trying to enter the industry until the expected value of




[Vd(¯ z)+( N − 1)Vlow(¯ z)]dG(¯ z)+( N − 1)
Z +∞
zhi
[Vhi(¯ z) − Vlow(¯ z)]dG(¯ z)
(24)
where the equilibrium condition for the cutoﬀsa r eg i v e nb y( 1 0 )a n db yt h es y s t e m
showed earlier. The remaining steps are similar to those explained earlier for the
n o - c o s to fe n t r yc a s e .W ej u s tn e e dt of o r m a l l yd e ﬁne the equilibrium concept for this























where (i) each consumer h chooses optimally sequences {Ct}t≥0 of a composite goods
to maximize the intertemporal utility function of equation (1) subject to an intertem-
poral budget constraint; (ii) incumbent ﬁrms choose, at every age a,p r i c ep(za) and
variable labor l(za) in order to maximize domestic proﬁts, given by equation (7), and
eventual exporting proﬁts, given by equation (??), taking the price index of the econ-
omy as given; (iii) incumbent ﬁrms, at every age a, decides if to keep being active
(Da =1 )o rt oe x i t( Da =0 ) and if to export (Ea =1 )o rn o t( Ea =0 ) knowing that
productivity evolves according to the Brownian motion of equation (4); (iv) ﬁrms
enter, if the productivity draw is bigger than zd, until the free-entry condition (24) is
satisﬁed; (v) labor and goods markets clear.
12Determination of a closed-form solution for µe(.) is the subject of ongoing research.
296 Conclusions and Extensions
This paper presents a model of international trade with heterogenous producers sub-
ject to uncertain productivity. Our innovation is to introduce ﬁrms speciﬁcp e r m a n e n t
productivity shocks and derive a stationary industry equilibrium in a multi-country
competition model.
We ﬁrst embed ﬁrms subject to ex-post uncertainty into a monopolistic competi-
tion model. We derive the stationary distribution of ﬁrm characteristics and establish
the conditions for the equilibrium of the economy under autarky. We then determine
an equilibrium for an integrated world market with symmetric countries. Several
results of previous trade models with heterogenous producers are derived. We then
show how uncertainty alters in a nontrivial way some of the conclusions of previous
studies. In particular, we show that introducing positive entry costs in a framework
where productivity is evolving stochastically changes the well know partition of ﬁrms
by exporting status. We derive explicit conditions to determine the factors that af-
fect the band of inaction in which domestic ﬁrms continue to sell domestically and
exporting ﬁrms continue to export. Our model retains the prediction that exporters
are more productive than nonexporters but also allows for the natural fact that some
nonexporters are more eﬃcient than some exporters. Finally, in our framework, both
entrants and incumbent ﬁrms might sustain temporary negative proﬁts because of
the expectation of becoming proﬁtable later on. An important feature of the model
is that it is amenable to simulation and estimation and can be used as an eﬀective
tool to better understand the consequences of trade opening and trade policies. We
derived closed-form solutions for several static and dynamic moments that can be
used to match the model to the data. The model can then be easily extended to
analyze the eﬀects of trade policies in a context of multiple asymmetric countries.
The study of transition dynamics is a more complex but natural extension. All these
are subjects of ongoing research.
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33AA p p e n d i x
A.1 Value of the Firm
A.1.1 Domestic
In order to derive the value of a ﬁrm that is selling only on the domestic market
(equation (9)) and the corresponding productivity cutoﬀ (equation (10)) we need to






















d (z) is a particular solution of the non-homogeneous ode and V h
d (z) is the
general solution of the homogeneous ode. The latter has the form
V h
d (z)=c1eβ1z + c2eβ2z
where c1 and c2 are two constants to be determined and β1 and β2 are the roots of
the characteristic equation associated to the homogeneous ode,
1
2
























The general solution of the homogeneous equation represents the value of the
option to exit. The likelihood of abandonment in the not-to-distant future becomes
extremely small as z goes to ∞, so the value of the abandonment option should go to
34zero as z becomes very large. Hence the coeﬃcient c1 corresponding to the positive
root β1 should be zero. This leaves
V h
d (z)=c2eβ2z
We need to ﬁnd the particular solution to the non-homogeneous ode. Using the
"undetermined coeﬃcients" method, the particular solution when the forcing term
has the form Ade(σ−1)z + Bd is V
p
d (z)=Ce(σ−1)z + D. Hence, we just need to plug
this into the non-homogeneous ode and ﬁnd C and D that makes V
p



















Now using the boundary conditions Vd(zd)=0and dVd(zd)/dz =0we can deter-



















Now we can use dVd(zd)/dz =0and the expression for c2 to determine zd,
dVd(zd)/dz =0 ⇔ c2β2eβ2zd −
Ad(σ − 1)
1



























β2 − (σ − 1)
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since σ>1 and β2 < 0.
Interpretation of Vd(z)
1. The two components of the general solution of the ode Vd(z) have a straight-
forward interpretation. Using Ito’s Lemma and recalling that dz = αda + ξdB,










d(z)+1 /2ξ2(σ − 1)2πv
d(z)
¤
da + ξ(σ − 1)πv
d(z)dB
that is, variable proﬁts behave like a geometric Brownian motion with drift
£
α(σ − 1) + 1/2ξ2(σ − 1)2¤
πv
d(z) and diﬀusion ξ(σ − 1)πv
d(z). Hence, if we de-
note today’s variable proﬁts by πv
d(za), the expected value and variance of vari-



































(r + δ) − α(σ − 1) − 1/2ξ2(σ − 1)2
which represents the value of a ﬁrm without ﬁxed costs fd.S i n c efd is constant










36so that the other component of the general solution of the ode, V h
d (z),r e p r e s e n t s
the value of the option to exit.
2. The exit cutoﬀ zd is smaller than the zero-proﬁtc u t o ﬀ z0.N o t et h a tz0 − zd =
(1 − γd)z0.S o w e j u s t n e e d t o p r o v e t h a t γd < 1. This condition can be
expressed as
(r + δ) >α β 2 +1 /2ξ2(σ − 1)β2
which is satisﬁed when α>0 since β2 < 0, σ>1.
A.1.2 Export
In order to derive the component of the value of the ﬁrm due to export we need to























¢σ−1 and Bex = −fx. Since the forcing function is deﬁned
diﬀerently when current proﬁts are positive or negative we need to solve the equation
separately for the two cases and then stitch together the two solutions at the point









In the region z<z ex,w eh a v et h a tπex(z)=0and only the homogeneous part of
the equation remains. Therefore the general solution is
V h0
ex (z)=k1eβ1z + k2eβ2z
where k1 and k2 are two constants to be determined and β1 and β2 are the roots,
derived earlier, of the characteristic equation associated to the homogeneous ode.
37In the region z>z ex, we take another linear combination of the exponential
solutions of the homogeneous part, and add on any particular solution of the full









and the general solution for the case z>z ex is
V h1
ex (z)=b1eβ1z + b2eβ2z −
Aex
1




Now note that, in the region z<z ex, operation is suspended but there is a positive
probability that the productivity process wi l la ts o m ef u t u r et i m em o v ei n t ot h er e g i o n
z>z ex, when operation will resume and proﬁts from exporting accrue. The value
V h0
ex (z) when z<z ex, is just the expected present value of such future ﬂows. As z
becomes very small the event of its rising above zex is very unlikely and so the value
V h0
ex (z) should go to zero. We can therefore set the constant k2, corresponding to the
negative root β2,t oz e r o .
Now let’s consider the region z>z ex. The part of V h1
ex (z) diﬀerent from the
particular solution represents the additional value of the option to suspend operations
in the future should z fall below zex.A sz becomes very large the value of this option
should go to zero and so we can set to zero b1, the constant associated to the positive










Note that since the Brownian motion can diﬀuse freely across the zex boundary, the
value function cannot change abruptly across it. The solution must be continuously
diﬀerentiable across zex. We therefore have the following two conditions
k1eβ1zex = b2eβ2zex −
Aex
1




k1β1eβ1zex = b2β2eβ2zex −
Aex(σ − 1)
1
2ξ2(σ − 1)2 + α(σ − 1) − (r + δ)
e(σ−1)zex







































































2ξ2(σ − 1)2 + α(σ − 1) − (r + δ)









A.2.1 The Density m(z|¯ z)

























The roots of the characteristic polynomial of the Kolmogorov equations are non-

















39Integrating out a we obtain an expression for the marginal probability of produc-
tivities given an initial starting level. We are going to consider only ¯ z>z d,s ot h a t ,
































= m1 − e
−2α
ξ2 (¯ z−zd)m2








exp(−θ[z +¯ z − 2zd])
p
α2 +2 ξ2δ























1 − e−θ∗(¯ z−zd)
i
=
1 − e−θ∗(¯ z−zd)
δ
that can be used to transform m(z|¯ z) and m(a,z|¯ z) into the probability densities
(14) and (15)
µ(z|¯ z)=



























40A.2.2 Mean Value of Productivity











































Assumption 2 guarantees that θ>1 which is necessary for the last integral, in the

















































A.2.3 Equilibrium Rate of Entry
Consider the stationary distribution
µ(a,z, ¯ z)=e−δaψ(a,z|¯ z)g(¯ z)
Ma
M
The latter is a probability density for a particular value of Ma/M. T h i si su s e dt o
determine the amount of entry that must take place relative to the number of existing



















































A.2.4 The Stationary Distribution of Productivity
Use the attempted entry rate equation (17) to get the probability density
µ(a,z, ¯ z)=












and replace the equation for p(a,z|¯ z) into the above to get






































42A.2.5 Average Age, Productivity and Size of Exporters
For the case with no hysteresis, we need to derive the marginal probability density of
age and the marginal probability density of productivity over the interval (zex,∞).
For age, we start by integrating µ(a,z, ¯ z) over ¯ z to derive µ(a,z).T h e n w e g e t
the conditional probability density µ(a,z|z>z ex) as the ratio of µ(a,z) and the












µ(z|¯ z)µ(¯ z)d¯ zdz
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dzda












µ(z|¯ z)µ(¯ z)d¯ zdz
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µ(z|¯ z)µ(¯ z)d¯ zdz
dadz
A.2.6 Survivor Function
We derive the survivor function for ﬁrms of age a in two steps13: ﬁrst we derive the
survivor function for ﬁrms whose current productivity is x, P(T(zd) >t |x).T h e nw e
derive the probability density of productivity conditional on age, µ(x|a). Finally we
combine the two to ﬁnd P(T(zd) >t |a), the probability of exiting no sooner than t
years from now given the current age of the ﬁrm a.
P(T(zd) >t |x)=1− Φ
µ

































A.3.1 System of Equations
The system of equations that implicitly deﬁnes the threshold values zlow and zhi and


















¢σ−1 (σ − 1)
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¢σ−1 (σ − 1)
1
2ξ2(σ − 1)2 + α(σ − 1) − (r + δ)
e(σ−1)zlow = β1a1eβ1zlow
A.3.2 Properties of zlow and zhi
Exporting Cutoﬀ (zhi) Deﬁne the function,
D(z) ≡ Vex,hi(z) − Vex,low(z)


















Figure 6: Firm’s Incremental Value of Becoming an Exporter over (zlow,z hi)
that can be interpreted as the ﬁrm’s incremental value of becoming an exporter, over
the range (zlow,z hi).14 When z is small, the dominant term in D(z) is the one with
t h en e g a t i v er o o tβ2. It is decreasing and convex in z.W h e nz is large the dominant
term is the one with the positive root β1.15 This term is negative, decreasing and
concave. For intermediate values, the third term contributes to the increasing portion
of D(z) (see Figure (6)).
Consider the upper threshold zhi. Subtracting the diﬀerential equation for Vlow





Evaluating at zhi and using the boundary conditions that must hold at zhi,w eg e t




or πex(zhi) > (r+δ)fhy > 0 which means that zhi is larger than the productivity level
at which the ﬁrm decides to become an exporter when there is no uncertainty and z
is constant over time.
14Here we follow a similar case illustrated in Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
15This is guaranteed by Assumption 1, which by stating that ρ + δ>α (σ − 1) + ξ
2(σ − 1)
2/2,
actually impose that (σ − 1) <β 1. To prove it just solve the inequality for (σ − 1) and ﬁnd that the
solutions gives |σ − 1| <β 1. Recall also that demand is elastic so that σ>1.
46Width of the Band of Inaction Deﬁne, over the range (zlow,z hi),
D(z)=Vex,hi(z) − Vex,low(z)
















We are going to ﬁnd out what is the eﬀect of a small change in fhy on the cutoﬀ
thresholds zlow and zhi. First, totally diﬀerentiate the value-matching conditions
Dz(zhi,a 1,b 2)dzhi + Da1(zhi,a 1,b 2)da1 + Db2(zhi,a 1,b 2)db2 = df hy
Dz(zlow,a 1,b 2)dzlow + Da1(zlow,a 1,b 2)da1 + Db2(zlow,a 1,b 2)db2 =0
which, using the smooth-pasting condition, simplify to
Da1(zhi,a 1,b 2)da1 + Db2(zhi,a 1,b 2)db2 = df hy
Da1(zlow,a 1,b 2)da1 + Db2(zlow,a 1,b 2)db2 =0
and
−eβ1zhida1 + eβ2zhidb2 = df hy
−eβ1zlowda1 + eβ2zlowdb2 =0




< 0 since eβ2(zhi−zlow) < 1, β1 > 0 and
zhi >z low.N o wd i ﬀerentiate the ﬁrst smooth-pasting condition at zhi
Dzz(zhi,a 1,b 2)dzhi + Dza1(zhi,a 1,b 2)da1 + Dzb2(zhi,a 1,b 2)db2 =0
47that, after using the expressions for da1 and db2 yields







Recall that D(z) is concave at zhi so that Dzz(zhi,a 1,b 2) < 0. Note that the term in
front of df hy is negative as well so that dzhi/dfhy > 0. When the cost of entering the
export market is higher, the export cutoﬀ is also higher.
Now diﬀerentiate the second smooth-pasting condition at zlow
Dzz(zlow,a 1,b 2)dzlow + Dza1(zlow,a 1,b 2)da1 + Dzb2(zlow,a 1,b 2)db2 =0
which yields







Recall that D(z) is convex at zlow so that Dzz(zlow,a 1,b 2) > 0. Note that the term
in front of df hy is still negative so that dzlow/dfhy < 0. When the cost of entering
the export market is higher, the export-abandon cutoﬀ is lower. This proves that the
width of the band of inaction is an increasing function of fhy.
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